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Students protesting against the 2026 NEET-UG paper leak gathered at Jantar Mantar on 20 July 2026, ahead of the Parliament March. Photo: Sumita Roy Dutta/Wikimedia Commons

The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) is a youth-led Indian satirical political movement prompted after India’s chief justice, while discussing unemployed young people and fraudulent qualifications, compared them to cockroaches in July 2026. What started as an online reaction r, soon led to demonstrations in several cities across the country. But just as the protests quickly escalated from online spaces to the streets, there was backlash also on both fronts.

Since July, APC member SFLC.in has issued several statements against digital rights violations amid CJP protests in India, mass surveillance, arbitrary takedown of online content, internet shutdowns and shadow banning. The organisation also prepared a list of toolkits and informational resources to help people stay connected when it matters most. RightsLine, their pro bono digital rights helpline, received more than 500 requests during this period.

In this interview with SFLC.in's founder, Mishi Choudhary. explains recent events in the country, shedding light on how violations of digital rights, freedom of expression and the right to peaceful protest intersect during moments of repression. She also highlights what needs to change to ensure these rights are better protected in India as well as in other parts of the world. Read on.

Could you explain what the Cockroach Janta Party is, when did it start, and what is it like now?

CJP began in May 2026 as a satirical online response to remarks made by India’s chief justice while discussing unemployed young people and fraudulent qualifications. Young Indians reclaimed the word “cockroach” and used humour, memes and parody to talk about unemployment, examination system failures and the lack of accountability for decisions affecting students.

It called itself a party, but it did not begin as a conventional political organisation. Its immediate campaign arose from alleged irregularities and a paper leak involving NEET – the national examination for admission to medical colleges. Students often spend years preparing for this examination, and many families make considerable financial sacrifices in India where education is considered an important or the only way of upward social mobility. CJP demanded reforms to the examination system and the resignation of Union Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan.

An online campaign soon developed into protests in several cities. On 20 July, CJP organised the Chalo Sansad march from Jantar Mantar towards Parliament in New Delhi. The demonstrations were largely peaceful, although clashes took place. 

There were reports of excessive police force, detentions and intimidation. Mobile internet was suspended in parts of Central Delhi, transport access was restricted, and a range of surveillance technologies was reportedly deployed around the protest site. SFLC.in volunteers confirmed this through in-person participation.

Minister Pradhan resigned on 25 July. CJP withdrew its agitation at Jantar Mantar after receiving government assurances concerning protesters, compensation and proposed reforms as a lot of issues with respect to harassment of protestersremain. It has since continued with civic activity, including inspections of government schools. It is still a young and loosely structured movement, and it is too early to say what permanent political or organisational form it will take.

During this period, SFLC.in received and documented reports of emerging digital rights concerns, which led the organisation to release several statements. Could you identify patterns across digital rights issues you documented?

On 20 July, mobile internet was suspended in parts of Central Delhi while the march was taking place. The suspension order had not been published before it was implemented, even though the Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024 require publication. Barricades and the closure of some metro access points made it difficult to reach the protest site. Once there, people could not reliably communicate with organisers, family members, lawyers or journalists.

We also received an unprecedented number of reports of posts being removed, accounts being suspended or restricted, and protest-related material becoming difficult to find through our RightsLine project that offers assistance for violation of online rights. The affected users included journalists, factcheckers, cartoonists, media organisations, protesters and political representatives. 

Some were told only that action had been taken in response to a “legal request”. They were not told who had made the request, what law had been invoked or which part of the content was considered unlawful.

The reports of reduced visibility or what is colloquially known as "shadow banning" were especially difficult to investigate. A user can see that the reach of a post has suddenly fallen or that the post no longer appears in search and recommendations. The user cannot see whether this resulted from automated moderation, a platform policy, a government request or a change in the recommendation system. We were careful not to describe every such report as proven government action. SFLC.in asked platforms to disclose enough information to establish what had occurred.

At the protest site itself, media reports and accounts from participants described the use of FRT-enabled cameras, facial recognition systems, automatic number-plate recognition, surveillance vehicles, body-worn cameras and smart glasses (details). The government did not provide enough public information about what data was collected, whether people were identified, which databases were searched or how long the information would be retained. For a person deciding whether to attend a protest, that uncertainty can itself be intimidating.

During this period, did the platforms disclose any information regarding the number, nature, source and outcome of government requests or orders for content removal and account restriction? Did they provide any explanation in terms of content moderation?

No complete disclosure was made covering the requests associated with the protests. Some users received a notification stating that their content had been restricted following a “legal request”, which is not a meaningful explanation. It does not identify the requesting authority, the legal provision relied upon, the allegedly unlawful material or the territorial extent of the restriction. It does not tell the user whether the platform reviewed the request or simply complied with it.

CJP’s account on X was withheld in India on 21 May, four days after the movement began, pursuant to an order under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act and the Blocking Rules, 2009. CJP’s founder challenged the action before the Delhi High Court without initially having access to the underlying order. The government’s position was therefore known to the government and the platform, but not to the person whose speech had been restricted.

SFLC.in has a petition pending in the Supreme Court challenging this exact obscurity around such rules. Rule 16 of the Blocking Rules requires confidentiality regarding blocking requests and related proceedings. In practice, it is often used to withhold the order from the affected person. We do not accept that confidentiality should prevent a person from knowing the case against them.

Platforms do issue periodic transparency reports, but national aggregate figures do not tell a journalist or protester why a particular post was removed. Users need a specific notice and a real opportunity to appeal.

This situation has shown very concretely how the online and offline worlds are inseparable. How does restricting digital rights impact other fundamental rights, such as the right to protest, freedom of expression and press freedom?

A person attending a protest uses the internet to find the location, check changes to the route, contact other participants and tell family members that they are safe. Organisers use it to communicate instructions and respond to emergencies. Journalists use it to file reports and transmit photographs and video. When mobile internet is suspended at the protest site, all of these activities are affected. So are residents, workers and businesses in the surrounding area.Takedowns can determine what the public sees while events are unfolding.

Surveillance also changes behaviour. A student or government employee may stay away from a lawful protest if attendance could be recorded through facial recognition and checked against government databases. A source may refuse to speak to a journalist. A participant may stop recording police conduct. None of these people need to be arrested for surveillance to interfere with their freedom of expression and association.

Restrictions must have a legal basis and satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Those standards apply during public protests, when the risk of suppressing lawful political speech is particularly high.

What needs to change to protect these rights? What should platforms be doing, and what should public authorities be doing?

Platforms must have transparency. They need to tell users clearly what has happened to their content and not hide behind T&C. The notice should identify the post or account affected, the action taken and whether it resulted from the platform’s own rules or a government request. If a public authority requested the restriction, the user should ordinarily be told which authority acted and under what provision of law. The notice should also provide a direct route to appeal.

Cases involving journalism, political speech, satire or documentation of a public event should receive prompt human review. Users are too often sent an automated response repeating the same policy language that appeared in the original notice. Restoration after several weeks may be technically successful, but the report has already been excluded from public discussion at the relevant time.

We also need a change in law that produces complete transparency and does away with secrecy. Public authorities must use the procedures prescribed by law. Blocking orders should identify the content covered and contain reasons that can be examined by a court. The affected person should receive notice and an opportunity to respond, apart from a narrowly confined emergency process. Internet shutdowns should stop entirely but until that happens all orders must be published promptly. The order should state the area affected, its duration and the facts relied upon to justify the measure.

Police use of facial recognition and other biometric surveillance also requires a proper statutory framework. India currently lacks a law that clearly regulates when these systems may be used, which databases may be searched and when the collected information must be deleted. Use at a peaceful protest should require a specific justification. Routine recording and identification of everyone present cannot be treated as ordinary crowd management.

We know that SFLC.in has been acting to uphold these rights. Could you tell us about your main areas of action?

We approached the Delhi High Court to challenge the suspension of mobile internet in Central Delhi. We sought disclosure of the suspension orders and compliance with Anuradha Bhasin and the 2024 Suspension Rules. SFLC.in is also pursuing a constitutional challenge concerning provisions of the Blocking Rules that permit orders affecting speech to remain hidden from the affected person.

Through our Free Speech Tracker, we documented content takedowns, account restrictions and other interference with protest-related speech. This record is important because platform notices can disappear, accounts may later be restored without explanation, and aggregate transparency reports do not show what happened during a particular protest.

RightsLine, our pro bono digital rights helpline, received more than 500 requests during this period. We helped people dealing with account and content restrictions, searches and seizures of devices, online gender-based violence and other digital harms. The volume of requests showed how difficult the existing grievance systems are for an ordinary user. Even lawyers and journalists often struggle to identify who ordered a restriction and where it can be challenged.

We also produced practical material for protesters, including pocket-sized information cards, advice on communicating during a shutdown and guidance concerning device searches and online harassment. Resources were made available in several Indian languages. This work was done alongside public statements, media engagement and coordination with other civil society organisations.

Is there a message you would like to share with independent voices and other civil society organisations facing similar issues across the world?

We have learned at least a few things over the course of several years of doing this work. We document everything. We preserve the platform notice, the URL, screenshots, timestamps and correspondence with the platform. For an internet shutdown, record the location, service provider, type of service affected and duration. Where the cause of a restriction cannot be established, say what was observed and what remains unknown. That care gives the record credibility.

We all must prepare beforehand by setting up secure reporting channels and identifying lawyers and technical experts who can respond quickly. Guidance should be short, practical and available in the languages spoken by the communities likely to need it. People should know where to seek help if their account is blocked, their device is seized or their personal information is published to intimidate them.

It is also necessary to identify how a restriction was imposed. A platform’s automated system, an internal moderation decision, a police notice and a formal government blocking order may produce the same result for the user, but the available remedies are different.

Platforms should not be allowed to hide behind an unexplained reference to local law. Governments should not be allowed to secure the removal of lawful speech through informal communications that leave no reviewable order. 

Civil society organisations have limited resources, especially during a fast-moving protest. Sharing verified information and dividing work among lawyers, technologists, local groups and journalists is often the only workable response. During the CJP protests, that cooperation helped us provide individual assistance while documenting practices that require judicial scrutiny and legal reform.